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Abstract 
Uber is a very well-funded operation that has made innovative use of smartphone technology 
in the highly regulated and bureaucratic market of international taxi cab operations. The 
company have often adopted an aggressive approach when entering the marketplace in a 
given city, so the question arises as to how should the incumbent taxi trade react to such 
fierce competition that is popular with the public. 
This paper describes a literature review related to the taxi and private hire industry in London 
that provides a foundation to answer this question. A second paper will present 
recommendations to help organisations prepare a response to the new competition.  
From the collated journals, various themes emerged and their reference lists were analysed 
to review recurring authors. The literature was organised into a thematic analysis grid to 
critique the content and analyse the implications for a project to evaluate the possible way 
forward for the taxi trade in response to Uber’s aggressive approach. Six key themes were 
identified: disruptive innovation, sharing economy, business model, historical context, 
regulations and labour. 
The literature review was extended to include studies of the same area in the United States 
(US). Caution was exercised, as the US market operates different ground transportation 
services and regulations. Nonetheless, comparisons were drawn regarding factors which were 
similar. 
The identification of the six key themes will aid the taxi trade as well as researchers who wish 
to investigate the impact of Uber as and when it moves into new international markets. 
 
 
1 
 
1 Background and Focus 
1.1 Introduction 
London’s private hire vehicle (PHV) industry (sometimes known as ‘minicabs’) provides a ‘pre-
book’ vehicle service for passengers. The term private hire differentiates the service from 
taxis (black cabs) who retain the privilege of being able to ‘ply-for-hire’ i.e. being hailed on 
the street, in addition to being pre-booked. The private hire service complements other 
ground transportation methods such as the underground (metro), buses and trains.  
The size of the UK taxi and private hire market is estimated at £9.4bn, with an expected 
compound annual growth rate of 1.1% to reach £9.9bn in 2021-22. The industry is mature, 
with high levels of revenue volatility, technological changes and competition, with low 
barriers to entry. 
Recent figures indicate London’s private hire market comprises 2,445 operators, 116,453 
drivers and 88,412 vehicles. Since 2012/13 operator numbers have declined by 23%, however 
driver and vehicle numbers have increased by 74% and 77% respectively (Transport for 
London, 2017).  
Transport for London (TfL) regulates the London industry and implements the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy. Within TfL, the Taxi and Private Hire (TPH) division acts as the regulator, 
licensing, enforcement and strategic transport authority. Key stakeholders in the industry are 
the Mayor, TfL/TPH, operators, trade associations, trade unions, drivers, passengers and the 
public. 
Smartphone booking applications (apps) were first introduced in the UK in 2011 with Hailo 
(now MyTaxi) for London’s black cabs. This was quickly followed by Uber which was launched 
in London in July 2012 (Dumitru, 2016). Today, 42% of private hire journeys are booked 
through a mobile app, with Uber at 85%, Addison Lee at 7% and Kabbee at 5% (Taxi and 
Private Hire, 2016a). 
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1.2 Rationale 
Smartphone booking apps have revolutionised the way passengers book their journeys, with 
an annual TPH survey (Taxi and Private Hire, 2016a) identifying those most frequently used 
as Uber, Addison Lee, Hailo, Kabbee, Climate Cars and Karhoo. Uber and Kabbee’s usage 
increased from 2015 to 2016 whereas Addison Lee and Climate Cars decreased; Hailo 
(MyTaxi) did not feature in the 2016 results. 
The overall satisfaction with TPH’s service has declined among PHV operators and drivers, 
although it is still higher than taxi drivers (Taxi and Private Hire, 2016b). This is against a 
backdrop of policy and operational changes.  
1.3 Problem Definition and Scope 
Smartphone booking apps have disrupted the private hire industry and driver earnings since 
they were launched (Elliott, 2016; Cramer and Krueger, 2016). According to Harding et al 
(2016) smartphone booking apps do not have exclusive jurisdiction, leading to a potential 
overlap between fleets. Elliott (2016) suggests that the e-hailing and meter-like features of 
apps position them closer to the definition of a taxi. Cramer and Krueger (2016) examined the 
efficiency and capacity utilisation rate of Uber’s ridesharing service by comparing the capacity 
utilisation rate of UberX drivers to that of taxi drivers. Their study found that UberX drivers 
had higher capacity utilisation. 
The introduction of smartphone booking apps has transformed a traditional industry in two 
ways by providing on-demand availability, anytime, anywhere and converting idle car-and-
driver assets from non-use to use through technology (Smith, 2016). According to Smith 
(2016), what is ahead is a shift in the dominant business model to one in which all consumer 
services will be available on demand, which is referred to as the ‘Uber-All’ economy of the 
future. Berger, Chen and Frey (2017) suggest there is minimal impact on labour market 
outcomes from the introduction of Uber, although they do note that wage-employed drivers 
experienced declining earnings. While Hall and Krueger (2016) note the interest in Uber is the 
flexibility it provides for its drivers in terms of working hours and complementing other 
incomes. 
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Although many factors have been suggested for the impact smartphone booking apps have 
created, the effect of on-demand appears as a common thread (Cramer and Krueger, 2016; 
Smith, 2016). Unfortunately, very little attention has been given to exactly what private hire 
operators are doing to remain competitive considering the market changes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Utilising unused assets has become a new phenomenon since 2008, with organisations such 
as AirBnB and Uber. Kathan, Matlzer and Veider (2016) suggest this transformation occurred 
after the economic crash where individuals needed to find temporary employment and earn 
extra income, combined with internet-based technology developments. Traditional industries 
such as the private hire vehicle market have been impacted and the literature review seeks 
to understand the emerging themes. 
The literature review commenced with a wide article search related to the taxi or private hire 
industry in London. This found limited studies so the search was extended to the United States 
(US). Caution was exercised as the US market operates different ground transportation 
services and regulations. Nonetheless, comparisons were drawn regarding factors which were 
similar. From the collated journals, various themes emerged and their reference lists were 
analysed to review recurring authors. The literature was organised into a thematic analysis 
grid (Anderson, Lees and Avery, 2015) to critique the content and analyse the implications for 
this project. Six key themes were identified as illustrated in figure 1. 
The review concentrated on peer-reviewed journals to maintain high standards (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Clayton Christensen, the pioneer of disruptive innovation theory 
(Adner, 2002; Markides, 2006; Tellis, 2006; Schmidt and Druehl, 2008; Yu and Chang, 2010; 
Vriens and Søilen, 2014; Evans, 2017; Vecchiato, 2017) was one deviation, where Harvard 
Business Review publications were utilised. The review was distilled into 61 items from 112 
resources, covering the period from 1995 to 2017, with one historical exception. 
4 
 
 
Figure 1. Key themes identified from the literature review
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2.2 Critical Review 
2.2.1 Disruptive Innovation 
Christensen, Raynor and McDonald (2015) state disruptive innovation is often 
misappropriated, and corrected this by revisiting the initial disruptive technology theory 
(Christensen, 1997). The seminal work (Christensen, 1997) describes disruption theory as a 
smaller company with less resources being able to challenge larger, incumbent organisations. 
Christensen changed the term from disruptive technology to innovation when he co-wrote 
The Innovator’s Solution realising it is the business model, rather than the technology which 
is disruptive (Christensen and Raynor, 2013).  Disruptive innovation is either the production 
of sub-standard products which are more affordable and reduce margins or creating new 
markets where none existed. The dilemma for existing companies is they typically develop 
products for their best customers at higher prices. Bower and Christensen (1995) elaborate 
by suggesting it is remiss to ask existing customers what new technologies they want as they 
prefer ‘sustaining technologies’, such as client booking portals for high-end private hire 
services. Regarding Uber, Christensen, Raynor and McDonald (2015) analysed them and 
declared the original definition remains, and they are not a disruptive innovation but a 
‘sustaining innovation’ because they have not offered an inferior taxi or private hire service, 
and do not have less resources than the incumbents. 
Watanabe, Naveed and Neittaanmäki (2016) expand upon disruption theory and define 
Uber’s success as ‘institutional enablers’ due to three mega-trends which are the 
advancements in ICT, a paradigm change and a shift in people’s preferences. They define this 
gain of un-captured GDP (gross domestic product) as an ICT-driven disruptive business model. 
Markides (2006) argues that whilst he agrees with Christensen’s ground-breaking theory, 
there are different innovation types in addition to technology which are (new-to-the-world) 
radical product innovation and business model innovation. He stresses that each type of 
innovation has different implications for incumbents and how they should respond. This is 
supported by Laurell and Sandström (2016) who outline Uber is more prevalent as an 
‘institutional disruptor’.  
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Davis (2016) theorises that there is a regime shift in corporations where the transaction costs 
mean they are unable to service customers in the same way that platforms can. He asserts 
that traditional share-owned corporations are not the way to organise the economy and that 
values and politics will shape enterprises. Ultimately, scholars agree with Christensen’s 
theory, even if they add their own sub-divisions (Adner, 2002; Tellis, 2006; Yu and Chang, 
2010). Evans (2017) indicates that this paradigm shift could be bigger than the industrial 
revolution and suggests board directors should make informed decisions about the strategic 
options available to them. He also raises the development of autonomous cars and the impact 
they will have. The literature demonstrates that technology will continue to have an extreme 
effect, therefore it is beneficial to review studies which indicate how organisations could 
respond.  
Schmidt and Druehl (2008) complement Christensen’s theory with a three-step framework 
for analysing whether an innovation will be an opportunity or threat. The method reviews the 
innovation and the diffusion to which it maps. For example, ‘sustaining innovation’ is aligned 
to high-end encroachment, whereas a new product encroaches on the existing high end of 
the existing market and diffuses downwards. Conversely, ‘disruptive innovation’ is the 
opposite with ‘new-market disruption’ and ‘low-end disruption’ as other variables. Vriens and 
Sølein (2014) expand on this suggesting an incumbent company should gather disruptive 
intelligence to predict the impact. Unfortunately, the literature focuses mostly on 
recommendations for large organisations and does not accommodate small businesses with 
limited resources or strategic acumen. 
2.2.2 Sharing Economy 
The sharing economy is interchangeably used to describe organisations such as AirBnB, 
ZipCar, TaskRabbit, Uber et al., however it appears there is no consensus on what the term 
means or how it first came into use. Martin (2016) suggests regime actors (policy makers and 
Government) frame it as an economic opportunity and creating unregulated market places. 
In comparison, he suggests niche actors (sharing economy advocates and investors) refer to 
it as sustainable consumption, a pathway to a sustaining economy and reinforcing the 
neoliberal paradigm. Gobble (2017) highlights that even leading authorities on the subject 
(Botsman and Rogers, 2011; Sundararajan, 2016) define the sharing economy respectively as 
7 
 
either collaborative consumption or crowd based capitalism and there are other iterations 
which Belk (2014) refers to as the post-ownership economy. 
However, Gobble (2017) notes the term is here to stay, so in the context of the private hire 
industry it is important to understand the definition to determine if smartphone booking apps 
are part of the sharing economy. The conclusion is that if a company says it is part of the 
sharing economy, it is, because it says so, in what Schor (2016) refers to as self-identification.  
These opinions are not helpful and a framework for determining whether a phenomenon is 
the sharing economy or not should correlate with commercial gain. Habibi, Davidson and 
Laroche (2017) developed such a framework and describe the model as either sharing or 
exchange. For example, one could question whether Uber is part of the sharing economy 
when industries are being built around it such as individuals buying cars for Uber drivers to 
rent or Uber drivers themselves entering in to long-term car leases to provide the service 
(Gobble, 2017).  This view is supported by Bean (2016) who challenges those that identify 
Uber with the sharing economy when the organisation has achieved significant growth from 
undercharging customers and offering drivers cash bonuses. Gobble (2017) concludes by 
suggesting Uber is not part of the sharing economy, but instead the access-economy and 
Martin (2016) asserts that all the time the sharing economy is involved in corporate co-option 
it is unlikely to drive a transition to sustainability. 
2.2.3 Business Model 
The shift in technology is best understood from an historical perspective where Denning 
(2014) explains there have been three phases. The first he attributes to ‘by-passing the 
middleman’ with the commercial internet, the second to the new value in ‘sharing’ with sites 
such as EBay and the third as an ‘economy of access’ where there is a choice whether to 
access or own.  
A thorough analysis facilitates understanding which components have made Uber’s access-
economy business model, or as Watanabe et al., (2017) suggest ‘ICT-driven disruptive 
business model’ so successful. Sorescu (2017) claims the business model must have three key 
components which are value creation, value delivery, and value appropriation.  The primary 
factor for Uber has been rapidly building a driver and passenger base and then using 
technology to match one with the other, combined with flexible labour.  
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MacDonald (2016) elaborates, explaining the business model exists because it is built on trust, 
although he does caveat this by questioning if it is sustainable. The result is capacity utilisation 
efficiency, which revealed UberX drivers work fifty percent of the time, compared with thirty-
two to fifty percent for traditional taxi drivers (Cramer and Krueger, 2016). 
Combined with capacity utilisation is growth hacking strategies (online-based marketing 
processes) which start-up companies use for rapid growth, customer acquisition and product 
market fit. Dalaman and Marsap (2017) reviewed Uber and attributed their evolution to 
several growth hacking strategies. First, customer acquisition through technology which 
provides the app experience along with driver information and the ability to pay securely. 
Second, a city-by-city expansion strategy which understood the unique characteristic of each. 
Third, referral marketing through bonuses to boost customer acquisition and future rides. 
These strategies were combined with early adopter advocacy, mutual trust and word of 
mouth marketing. Smith (2016) describes this business model shift as the ‘Uber-all’ economy 
of the future, where assets are turned from non-use, to use, and services are provided as 
‘come to’ instead of ‘go to’. 
On a positive note, the business model has reduced industry complaints to US regulators 
which related to drivers’ attitudes or infrastructure issues such as broken credit card 
machines and improved the industry’s service overall (Wallsten, 2015). 
While successful business models are impressive, there are naturally unintended side effects. 
Verboven and Vanherck (2016) refer to these as the ‘sustainability paradox’ and suggest four 
features which can determine a business model’s success long-term: minimising 
consumption; partial internalisation of externalities and reinvestment in social projects; 
employee and user protection and the prevention of aggressive competition and monopolies.  
The impact these business models represent is on the existing transportation networks and 
industry incumbents. Rayle et al., (2016) provide the consumer’s perspective and 
demonstrated that ridesourcing (app-based, on-demand, ride services) replaced taxi services 
fifty percent of the time, but fifty percent of the time it replaced other modes of transport. 
This was attributed to the service being more comfortable and convenient, short waiting 
times, and avoiding the need to find a parking space and passengers being able to drink 
alcohol without losing their licence. In London, Wood et al., (2017) echo this by suggesting 
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the impact on London’s transportation network has been filling a gap in transportation needs, 
providing easier movement and moving away from traditional transport such as night buses.  
To compete, Denning (2014); Habtay and Holmén (2014); Cusumano (2015) recommend 
referring to the regulations for violations, offer solutions and standardised services that 
cannot be matched and being mindful a response does not necessitate the need to establish 
a new business unit. Kathan, Matzler and Veider (2016) suggest managers should ask 
themselves the following questions: is my customer value proposition affected, is my profit 
formula affected, are my key resources and processes affected? 
The concern is whether smaller private hire operators can compete, or whether they fall by 
the wayside, with a few large operators remaining who could dictate higher fares and reduce 
driver compensation. Arguably, the biggest question is can organisations such as Uber survive 
beyond their current funding (Cusumano, 2015)? 
2.2.4 Historical Context 
Personal transportation in London has seen many impacts, starting in the seventeenth 
century when the hackney coach moved from tavern yards to ranks. This launched an 
industrial dispute between the coachmen and the Thames Watermen (Garner and Stokoe, 
2000) as previously the only way to cross the Thames was by boat or London Bridge (Wood 
et al., 2017). What followed was an Act of Parliament which established the Fellowship of 
Master Hackney in Coachmen 1654 and later by licensing and restricting coach numbers. In 
the nineteenth century, motorised cars caused controversy as they charged the same fare as 
coaches. Ironically, these were electric cars propelled by accumulator cells that could travel 
fifty miles before being recharged. There were many vehicle iterations, with some inherent 
faults which the press reported, highlighting stories of accidents, injury and breakdowns. 
Nonetheless, the situation inevitably changed when petrol vehicles were introduced in the 
early twentieth century (Warren, 1995). In 1903, there were 11,000 horse carriages and one 
petrol vehicle, and by 1913 this had switched to 8,000 petrol vehicles and 1,900 horse 
carriages (Thompson, 1976). 
In 1961, Welbeck Motors Ltd minicabs launched to a rival to the incumbent taxis. A taxi 
shortage (circa 1,000) and the requirement for cheaper fares were cited for their introduction. 
There were the inevitable protests by the licenced taxi trade foreseeing the impact minicabs 
10 
 
would have on their livelihoods (Sanderson, 2009; Roth, 2015). Lobbying by taxi drivers 
resulted in minicabs not being able to ‘ply-for-hire’ and this has remained a statute for the 
taxi trade. Conversely, minicabs were supported by new technology in the form of telephones 
in homes and phone boxes on the street, which allowed their service to be pre-booked 
(Sanderson, 2009). Although, the advent of radio circuits enabled taxis to provide the same 
service (Skok and Baird, 2005). In 1998, minicabs were finally licensed (although it took 
another seven years for operator, driver and vehicle regulations to be established). Licensing 
was partly attributed to Diana Lamplugh (mother of murdered Suzy Lamplugh) who 
campaigned for safer travel for working women due to an increase in sexual assaults, some 
of these suspected by illegal minicab drivers (Sanderson, 2009). Skok and Tissut (2003) 
considered the complexity, industry reforms and high-profile stakeholders, especially as taxis 
did not want minicabs regulated, because unregulated minicabs fuelled the taxi industry’s 
cause due to alleged safety issues. 
Following successful regulation, smartphone adoption combined with apps and geolocation 
services transformed the way customers could book a journey, along with Uber entering the 
UK market. 
2.2.5 Regulations 
Prior to reviewing the ‘regulations’ themed literature, it was noted that taxis adhere to the 
London Hackney Carriage Act 1853, and private hire vehicles to the Private Hire Vehicles 
(London) Act 1998. Both were conceived before the concept of booking a journey via a 
smartphone app were imagined.  
Dudley, Banister and Schwanen (2017) suggest TfL found it difficult to fit Uber’s technology 
to the existing rules due to outdated regulations. The e-hailing nature of Uber’s app is one 
example, which taxis argued is a form of taximeter reserved for their service and therefore 
contravenes the Hackney Carriage Act. 
At the court case (No: CO/1449/2015), Lord Justice Ouseley ruled; 
“A taximeter, for the purposes of Section 11 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 
1998, does not include a device that receives GPS signals in the course of a journey, 
and forwards GPS data to a server located outside of the vehicle, which server 
calculates a fare that is partially or wholly determined by reference to distance 
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travelled and time taken, and sends the fare information 
back to the device”. 
Uber, therefore retained their app format in London (Watanabe et al., 2017). In contrast, 
Allen (2015) and Gabel (2016) propose that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
regulators and incumbent actors which manifests itself as a quasi-monopoly. While these 
studies relate to the Australian and US markets, some similarities can be drawn with London’s 
taxis. However, the private hire industry regulations were borne out of protection for 
passengers. 
One area to highlight is passenger protection, which Pfeffer-Gillett (2016) questions whether 
app providers should be accountable for the conduct of their drivers. He argues they should, 
as they are the ones profiting from both the drivers and passengers. His US recommendations 
cover what takes place in London already. However, whether a driver is an employee or self-
employed is the root for determining the responsibility the app providers take for their 
drivers’ actions, along with how they represent their terms for passenger liability. 
The remaining literature provides the following recommendations. Anderson (2014) proposes 
a new transportation criterion which is referring to ‘for profit ridesourcing’ as Transportation 
Network Companies (TNCs) which harnesses innovation and separates them from regulatory 
constraints.  
Whether the regulator would want to apply the same approach in London remains to be seen, 
yet a third provider tier could be an approach (taxi, tier one; private hire, tier two; TNC, tier 
3). This is supported by Elliott (2016) who suggests there should be a new regulatory 
framework based upon the service provided. She also states this would enable the balance of 
innovation and public interest, but notes app providers should be involved in the process. 
Kortum (2015) highlights a variety of issues regulators should consider such as insurance, 
background checks, driver fingerprints, surge pricing, data privacy, disabled vehicle access 
and congestion. Although, Posen (2015) calls for experimental regulations which focus on 
consumer interests and not market entry controls. 
The discussions observed that incumbent monopolies are being protected (Gabel, 2016), 
however there is a consensus that regulators should ensure that app providers are also 
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monitored to avoid similar market dominance and monopoly control (Harding, Kandlikar and 
Gulati, 2016; Qian and Ukkusuri, 2017). 
2.2.6 Labour 
Farber (2015) replicated a study to uncover whether taxi drivers in the US use reference 
dependence or optimising behaviours. The view being that during inclement weather, a taxi 
driver will reach their daily income target more quickly and therefore be able to finish work 
sooner, rendering less taxis available for hire. The study found that while some drivers 
demonstrate reference dependence, optimising behaviour is more prevalent and this is a skill 
which is important when working in the industry. It can therefore be concluded that apps 
create this optimising behaviour electronically when matching drivers and passengers, and 
therefore fill gaps in supply. 
Berger, Chen and Frey (2017) support the benefits of capacity utilisation and state that app 
providers have had no negative employment impact on their drivers, but have reduced 
incumbent wage employed drivers’ earnings. This viewpoint is balanced by Chen et al., (2017) 
who propose that ‘Uber’s advantage is also its disadvantage’ (e.g. wages are uncertain and 
compensation may be low, but drivers can work whenever they want). Their study concluded 
the opportunity for low-skilled, flexible work to support other incomes is valuable. This is 
echoed by Hall and Krueger (2016) where Uber’s driver-partners choose the on-demand work 
to smooth fluctuations in their earnings in the knowledge that their earning per hour vary 
little to the hours worked. 
However, Glöss, McGregor and Brown (2016) contest this view and explain responsibility 
should be acknowledged for labour. Furthermore, they state that ‘on-demand’ labour 
transposes the optimising skills, to emotional labour and new financial risks. 
The studies may present a positive image of the on-demand workforce; however, the lines 
appear to blur between whether Uber’s drivers are independent contractors or employees 
(Stafford, 2016). Moreover, drivers take a personal risk in the event of an accident, servitude 
may prevail (Leighton, 2016) and bearing operating costs, no overtime pay and a lack of 
minimum wage may render the returns negligible (Ross, 2015). 
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